I was one of the first "foreign" journalists to go to Tajikistan and I was keen to register everything I saw. The most vivid image I have of my first day in Dushanbe is walking along Rudaki Avenue and seeing happiness everywhere. Every few meters I would come across all these famous faces I had heard about. It was a beautiful evening and they had come out for a stroll. First there was Gulrokhsar. I had written about her and her bravery in standing up to the Soviets. Then there was Layeq Shirali, possibly the most loved of all Tajik poets with a unique philosophy of humanity. Momen Qana'at, the "ustad" of all poets, Abdulhamid Samad, the unique novelist, Askar Hakim, brilliant narrator, literary critique and poet. Later I got to know Golnazar and Bazar Saber. They all had one message. They loved Tajikistan, they were proud of their cultural heritage and they wanted independence and progress for Tajikistan. None ever spoke about their particular "region".

When I returned I wrote a report for the BBC about the power of Tajik women who had kept the Tajik culture alive. I argued that by continuing to wear their traditional "Atlas" and by speaking to their children in their native language, women of Tajikistan had stood up to the might of the Soviet army. I wrote that the same power was now standing up to extremist views coming from Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Next year, 1992, I had come over to report on the demonstrations. The face of Rudaki had changed. The poets had not. The image this time was symbolised in the huge outcry for replacing the statue of Lenin with that of Ferdowsi. The demonstrators soon gained control of the parliament and toppled Rahmon Nabiev. He took refuge in Russian military barracks. Between March to May 1992 the former Soviet agents had done all they could to create civil war. They wanted to change the message of demonstrations. Instead of Tajiks standing up for their independence and their culture, the scene was changed to make it look as regional tension between Tajiks. They brought in bands of hooligans from across the country. Tajik was fighting Tajik in the name of regions. Some were wearing white head bands marked with blood on their foreheads. Others were carrying sticks of wood fortified with nails and glass. Demonstrations in three separate squares: That was where the seeds of "regionalism" were revived. From September to December 1992, the communists – with the support of Russian troops – launched a massive offensive in the south. By December 8 they took control of the capital, Dushanbe.

Five years of war and bloodshed deepened the wounds of mistrust. Concerning the economy more than five years of war led to disaster in the country’s finance and productivity. The infrastructures were destroyed and the population was extremely impoverished. These were excellent conditions for fermenting "regionalism". Thus ten years later it is still with us covering page after page of Tajik newspapers.

But if we look more carefully there is little logic behind the regional tension in Tajikistan. When inside one country one group of people distinguishes itself from another, there are theoretical classifications that can be applied for defining the causes of their ensuing tension.

The first classification is by those claiming ethnic or religious divide. The first indicators of such a division or classification are language and/or religious distinctions. Some of these lead to "separatist" movements. Take an example in Europe. The Basque separatists in Spain claim they have a different language and culture to the rest of the population and they wish to be separated from the mainland.

The offshoot of that is that the group may not be separatists but still wish for a divide based on ethnic differences. For instance Azeris in Iran may claim it their right to have separate schooling for their children where Azeri would be the main language taught at schools. Or Muslims living in the West may claim they wish to send their children to separate schools where Islam will be central to education.

Ethnic identity is thus defined as that relating to clear language, religion or cultural distinctions. Anthropologists would argue that even such identities arise under very specific conditions. Members of an ethnic group usually claim linguistic and cultural continuity over time. For instance Afghanistan is made up of various ethnic and religious groups: Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Turkmen and Hazareh and a number of other ethnic and religious groups. These may point to basic differences in their culture and belief systems that have continued to exist over a long period. Yet they accept to live in the same country since Afghanistan is their homeland and their religion, culture and history is intertwined with that land. Likewise in Iran you have distinguishable identities, language and customs, in Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Baluchestan and yet they all consider Iran as their homeland. In Tajikistan there are no such divisions.

Sometimes these classifications become complex and cause serious tension and civil war. For over 17 years Sri Lanka has been plagued with ethnic tension and civil war between Tamil and Sinhalese nationalists created mainly because of economic instability. There are several examples in Europe: Kosovo, Bosnia, Georgia/Abkhazia, Russia/Chechnya and so on.

A third classification is based on the idea that one nation, one race or one ethnic group claims it is "superior" to others. Something that Adolph Hitler claimed about the Aryans. One of the main theorists of "nationalism" Elie Kedouri says, most nationalist movements are "ostensibly against the foreigner, the outsider."* But he argues that at times they could be from one generation to the next in the same country. He argues that although some form of "nationalism" against "colonialism" and foreign dominations could be described as being "paved with good intentions" generally any idea of "superiority" of one group over and above other groups could be politically destructive. Any claim to "superiority" carries resonances of fascism and Nazism. The key attribute of fascism is intolerance of others: other religions, other customs, other cultures and other races. If the group claiming superiority happens to be in power and supported by the military – Hitler (Germany), Franco (Spain) or Mussolini (Italy) – then this could have devastating effects at times leading to ethnic cleansing or genocide.

Another cause of tension inside one country is tribal conflicts as we have witnessed in Africa. We were all shaken by the genocide in Rwanda, where one brutal tribal group, such as the Hutus, fought against another, the Tutsis. Or as we see on our TV screens today, the largest tribe in Kenya, Kikuyu, fighting another tribe called Lou. First, hundreds of Kikuyu were killed, and then they started killing members of Lou.

There is also the regionalism as found in several European countries. The United Kingdom is made up of Scotland, Wales, England and Northern Ireland. Switzerland is made up of German, Italian and French regions. These have long histories of war and destruction behind them. But again these have as their basis distinct languages and cultural differences. They may even claim certain political and administrative independence from the central Government. In any case these tensions have been ironed out for the most part or resolved within the democratic political structure.

But none of these classifications could be applied in Tajikistan today. The language, religion and culture of all Tajiks are the same and Tajiks form the overwhelming majority of the population in Tajikistan.

So it is hard to understand what Tajik "regionalists" are arguing about. Are they talking about the superiority of Kulab against Khujand or Gharm versus Zarafshan or Pamir? Aren’t these regions all populated with Tajiks whose religion is mainly Islam, and whose history and culture is one? Can you seriously point to ethnic, tribal, language or cultural differences between these regions? Could we claim by any scientific accuracy that one region is endowed with "genius" and another has none?

No, but it could be argued that this is an institutionalised tension intentionally created through the doctrine of "divide and rule", which is a legacy of the Soviet era. As long as "regionalism" survives in Tajikistan, Soviet legacy could be said to be alive and kicking.

The Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was established on November 10, 1924 and transferred to a Union Republic in 1929 after repressing tribal and regional revolts between 1922 and 1926. Tajik borders were marked artificially and did not coincide with the ethnographical reality. Out of over two million Tajiks only over 700,000 were included in the Tajik Republic. The soviets also tried to re-shape the cultural identity of the country. Samarkand and Bukhara, which had been at the heart of Tajik cultural heritage, were not kept in the Tajik SSR. "Therefore Tajikistan lost its urban cultural centre and the main piece of its identity," argues Benjamin Petrini in the Journal of Middle Eastern Geopolitics.**

In order to understand the roots of regionalism -- as reborn in 1992 – we have to understand that the Soviet rulers in Moscow ruled through "the practice of supporting regional groups that were faithful to Moscow’s interests", says Petrini. From 1946 to 1992 the ruling elite of the Tajik Communist Party came exclusively from the north, precisely the city of Khujand in Leninabad Province. When Gorbachev came to power he tried to rebalance the ruling elites in Central Asia by brining into the equation those groups that had been formerly out of power. So now "the Kulabis were co-opted in the ruling chain of command" adds Petrini. It is argued that other groups which had been excluded began fighting during the years of civil war to ensure the injustice is not repeated.

Whichever way you look at it this is an imported tension. It is the remnants of that 1920’s Soviet policy. It is a ploy artificially made to divide Tajiks. There is no ethnic, religious or tribal reason behind it. Yet it is paralysing thought and progress in Tajikistan. Over ten years after the civil war, the Tajik civil society is still nowhere to be seen. Doors are closed to discussion and debate, independent press is shattered through legal fabrications and economic prosperity is postponed. The population fearing another war suffers in silence. Ten years after a bloody civil war people still don’t have clean water in the capital city. They cannot be sure of regular supply of electricity or gas, there is sever unemployment and poverty, there are no proper hospitals and schools for their children. These are the problems that need to be resolved. Yet, the plague of "regionalism" is deterring the educated political activists to resolve these issues. The fight in the 1990’s was against the enemy without. But now the tension over "regional" superiority is orchestrated by the enemy within.

Layegh Shirlai, Golrokhsar, Momen Ghanat, Abdulhamid Samad, Asgar Hakim, Farzaneh, Golnazar, and Bozor Saber have all said it clearly in their prose and poetry if only you read them more carefully.

Dr. Massoumeh Torfeh is a research associate at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University. She was the Spokesperson and Chief of Public Information for the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan 1998-2000. Prior to that Massoumeh Torfeh was a senior producer in BBC World Service. From 2004-2006 she was the director of Tajik Service of Radio Azadi.

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*E. Kedouri, Nationalism, London 1966, Chapter 6.

**Benjamin Petrini, Russian Post-Soviet Foreign Policy in Central Asia: the case of Tajikistan, Year 3, volume 2, Journal of Middle Eastern Geopolitics, University of Rome