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Securing Political Regionalism

There was one more vilayat (province) in Tajikistan of the 1920s left unmentioned in the previous chapter, since it didn’t last long: Gharm province created out of Qarategin and Darvaz districts in the eastern part of the former Emirate of Bukhara. Soon it was abolished and in 1950s some of the Gharmis were forcibly relocated to the western part of Tajikistan.

During the same decade the northern regionalist government of the country abolished all vilayat level administrative units in southern Tajikistan too to establish a direct control over their districts.

"Such a structure kept them fragmented and prevented common action to challenge the Leninabadis… The fragmenting of potential opposition through administrative measures that promise micro-segmentation is a familiar one in the area; it was also used by the royal government of Afghanistan, which recognized local clans (qawm) rather than larger tribes as administration’s interlocutors." (Barnett R. Rubin, Jack L. Snyder, Post-Soviet Political Order, p.150).

Shared Political Regionalism

As time went on southern Tajikistan reached the level of self-sufficiency in number of communist cadres. Furthermore, in later decades, particularly in 1970s, Kulab occupied a significant position in an agricultural Tajikistan. Leninabad’s cotton industry depended mainly on southern raw cotton to be processed in the north. This is the main reason some experts cite to explain the rise in power of Kulabis as junior partners of the northerners. Subsequently, the southern vilayats of Kulab and Kurgan-teppa were reinstated and Leninabadis started to delegate regional administrative power to Kulabis. But still, political and economic control within the republic didn’t change hands. The North-South alliance remained intact until the empire’s last days.

All these regionalist shifts and deals were happening behind the curtains leaving ordinary people confused with their enormous task of developing a sense of Soviet nationhood. Their co-ethnics in Uzbekistan were undergoing a resumed process of Uzbekization under Sharof Rashidov’s chauvinist government. Those willing to stay in Uzbekistan had to get registered as Uzbek, otherwise they could have been deported to Tajikistan, since according to Rashidov’s administration, Uzbekistan was the land of Uzbeks only. Tajik nationalism among the ruling elite of Tajikistan was too underdeveloped to resist the Uzbek government’s crimes. Tajik pacifism against radical Uzbek chauvinism has led some researchers to a wrong conclusion that a Tajik identity simply did not exist. John Mackinlay and Peter Cross clarify the point in the following manner:

"This does not imply that a Tajik identity did not exist – it did, and it came into play when talk and business turned to relations with neighbouring Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Pushtun Afghanistan. However, whereas for example in Poland the Polish identity was strong enough to forge the Polish schisms together in a conflict, in Tajikistan the regional identity of people such as the Khujandi in the Leninabad region would in some cases drive them to join forces with Uzbeks against their fellow Tajiks from other regions." (John Mackinlay, Peter Cross, Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping, p. 161).

Later events demonstrated that the lack of nationalism was not inherent solely in Khojandi elites. The present Kulabi government came to power with military and political support of both Uzbekistan and Russia against Tajiks of other regions.

Budding Hopes

However, dramatic happenings in the Persian neighbourhood sent a breeze of hope that penetrated the Iron Curtain and reached Tajikistani nationalist intellectuals. Certainly there were figures among Tajik intelligentsia and at lower levels of the society who cherished their native identity and dreamt of closer ties with their co-ethnics abroad.

"Two events shaped Tajik national consciousness in 1979: the Soviet invasion of neighbouring Afghanistan and the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Tajik units sent to fight ethnic Tajiks in Afghanistan developed fervently anti-Soviet sentiments, often refusing direct orders to fight. In 1985 some eighty Tajik soldiers were shot for refusing to fire on their Tajik Afghan kin or fellow Muslims of other Afghan ethnic groups. The Islamic Revolution the overthrew the monarchy in Iran, led by Shi’a Muslim zealots, had a lesser effect on the more secular Soviet Tajik population; nevertheless, the revolution augmented a reculturation and a renewed interest in the long suppressed Islamic religion. (James Minahan, Miniature Empires: A Historical Dictionary of the Newly Independent States, pp. 260-261).

Afghanistan’s invasion triggered mixed reactions among Tajikistani nationalists. The Tajik Republic had been created as a socialist role-model for neighbouring Persian-speakers in the hope to annex them to the Soviet domain in later stages, if any opportunity looms. Therefore, among mainly angry nationalists there were some genuinely joyful ones who assumed that the moment of the re-union with their folks on the south bank of the river was approaching. Now we know how the story ended.

The anti-Soviet pro-Afghanistani fervour reached its culmination when several Tajik war veterans and interpreters who had served in Afghanistan alongside the Soviet troops burnt their certificates in Dushanbe in 1989 and after.

1989 is regarded as the year of national awakening in the modern history of Tajikistan. Then the first non-Communist nationalist organization of the republic emerged with a purely Persian idealistic name: "Rastakhez" (or "Rastokhez" meaning ‘renaissance’). The movement's future leaders led demonstrations to obtain an official status for the language of the country’s majority. The goal was achieved and a Language Law was ratified in 1989 to replace Russian with Tajiki (Farsi) as the official language of the state.

Contrary to some experts’ views, Rastakhez movement was not confined to any particular region of Tajikistan. Its leader, Tahir Abduljabbar, was from the north, while his deputies were from other parts of the country. Furthermore, Rastakhez declared its uncompromising position against the ruling regionalism.

"Its leaders were highly educated, avowedly "pro-Western" intellectuals… Rastokhez further called for an end to the "clannish, tribal, and regional loyalties" that pervaded the Communist Party and political leadership. (Kathleen Collins, Clans and Regime Transition in Central Asia, pp. 151-152).

A Moment of Confusion

Tajik localists were taken aback by a sudden emergence of a robust anti-regionalist movement and made hasty concessions in the beginning. But as soon as they re-gained the lost self-confidence, the nationalists were pushed back and regionalists won again.

Ruling elites took full advantage of ordinary Tajiks’ alienation from the Persian language and published an official interpretation of the word rastakhez. According to them, it meant "the day of judgement" or "end of the world" and the movement intended to bring it closer by creating havoc and anarchy in society.

A peaceful rally in February 1990 mysteriously turned into real mayhem; shops and bus stops were attacked, ransacked and burnt down by criminal gangs. The Bloody February (Bahmanmah-i Khunin) took 25 lives and left many injured. Thus, the prelude of the civil war took place. The government blamed it on Rastakhez and other newly-established opposition groups and tried to tighten its grip on the republic again. But it could not be achieved easily anymore. (to be continued)

Regionalism Vs Nationalism. Part 4